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Why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run aground? In this paper
we show that there might arise circumstances where the initial success of reform might result
in it running into a political impasse. We suggest that the key might lie in the eﬀect that the
reform process has on the balance of political power. In particular, if initially successful reforms
change the balance of political power in such a way as to make future redistribution less likely,
then public opinion may turn against reform. Thus, in some sense, an initially successful reform
may well end up sowing the seeds of its own destruction.
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The last couple of decades have witnessed the adoption of economic reform in many countries,
with considerable popular enthusiasm and political support accompanying their adoption. How-
ever, sustaining and completing the implementation of these reform packages has turned out to
be diﬃcult. In large part this diﬃculty in sustaining economic reforms is due to the erosion of
political support, which not only threatens the viability of the reform process, but also undermines
the nascent democratic institutions in many of these countries (Rodrik (1996) and Stokes (2001)).1
In this paper we examine the political sustainability of reform by analyzing the dynamic interaction
of public opinion and the reform process. We do this by focusing on a key puzzle in the political
economy of economic reform: why do economic reforms that are proceeding successfully often run
aground?
Two reasons are commonly put forth to explain the emergence of public opinion opposed to
continuation of economic reform in developing and transition economies. First, the ￿appropriateness￿
of the reform package itself may be uncertain. If the policies perform poorly, then citizens may
rationally infer that the reform package itself was ￿inappropriate￿ and may accordingly prefer not
only to stop the reforms but even reverse them. Of course with this explanation, it is not clear
why political support for the incumbent should come down unless the initial choice of reform
package was itself perceived by the citizen-worker to be a function of the government￿s ability. A
second possibility has to do with the government￿s ability in successfully implementing the reform
package. If the initial performance of the reform package is poor, then public opinion may turn
against economic reform. This erosion in political support arises because voters blame government
incompetence for the degree of economic hardship and dislocation they have to endure during the
period of adjustment (see Tommasi and Velasco (1996)).
These preceding explanations on the dynamics of public opinion and the implementation of
economic reform are well understood. There is little disagreement that economic reform, by causing
major structural changes, typically results in unemployment, dislocation and economic hardship.
1A c c o r d i n gt ot h eE B R D ￿ sTransition Report, 1999 (pp. 104), ￿In the transition countries, reforms have tended
to generate a political backlash in a majority of cases. In 14 of the 21 countries in the region that held competitive
elections, incumbents lost control of the government in the second election￿.Not only economists, but most of the general public understands this and still favors the adoption
of economic reform.2 Yet, what is puzzling is why a majority of citizen-workers change their mind
about continuing with the very policies that a majority of them had supported, even though the
initial impact of the reform is favorable (Rodrik, 1996). This is especially puzzling if one thinks
of voters as being forward looking, because then the performance of the reform should presumably
provide some indication of the shape of the future.
Such apparent anomalies are of more than theoretical interest. Stokes (pp. 25, 2001)s u m m a r i z e s
the results from her survey on public support for market reforms in new democracies, with the
following: ￿Our most startling result is that in every country people sometimes reacted to economic
deterioration by supporting the government and its economic program. Conversely, they sometimes
reacted to economic improvement with pessimism and opposition￿. For instance, consider the
case studies on the dynamics of public opinion in Mexico over the period 1988-97 (Laredo, 2001),
Fujimouri￿s Peru over the 90s (Stokes, 2001) and Argentina over the period 1989-1996 (Echegaray
and Elordi, 2001) . A l lt h e s eL a t i nA m e r i c a nc a s e ss u g g e s tt h ef o l l o w i n g￿ar e l a t i v e l ys u c c e s s f u l
initial economic reform (as measured in growth in wages in GDP) was accompanied with the
emergence of political opposition. Similarly, Stokes (1996) and Remmer (1991)d o c u m e n tf o ra
variety of mostly Latin American countries, public opinion about the reform process, and the
government implementing the reform, frequently varies negatively with the performance of the
reform. Stokes (1996) suggests that the public￿s responses frequently suggest that they hold ￿...the
belief that if things get worse they will later get better... [I]f the economy improves early on,
t h ep u b l i cm a yb e l i e v et h a tr e f o r m sa r ef a i l i n ga n dt u r na g a i n s tt h eg o v e r n m e n t ￿( p . 5 0 5 ) . F o r
example, she argues that ￿...Peruvians drew from the recent experience...the lesson that rising
wages spelled bad news about future in￿ation. Politicians, academics, and the press reinforced this
interpretation....￿ (p. 514). Finally, she summarizes some ￿ndings of Remmer￿s (1991) empirical
analysis of the political impact of economic crisis in 12 Latin American countries from 1982-1990:
￿[I]ncumbent parties suﬀered larger losses at the polls when in￿ation went down (signi￿cant),
the incumbent party￿s share of the vote was larger when in￿ation rose and when GDP fell (not
signi￿cant), and the party system was less stable when the exchange rate depreciated.￿ (p. 515)
2See Stokes (2001) for evidence on this.
2An examination of the experience of the transition economies provides additional evidence
of the kind of anomalies that we point out. For instance, consider the Polish experience with
economic reform in the past decade, which might be said to be typical of several country experiences.
Przeworski (1993) in his analysis of the public support for the Balcerowicz Plan summarized his
data as follows:
￿In sum, reforms enjoyed overwhelming support from the time they were announced
through the ￿rst four months of their implementation. This support declined sharply
after a few months but remained stable and sizable for the rest of the year. During
the subsequent six months, con￿dence in reforms fell sharply again, and after eighteen
months a clear majority of public opinion turned against them for the ￿rst time.￿
W en o wk n o wt h a tb y1993 the former communists were back in power. Przeworski (1993) in
his analysis of the dynamics of public support over the reform process claimed that his
￿...￿ndings may indicate individual myopia, albeit with a twist: Continuation of reforms
is threatened when the economy shows the ￿rst signs of recovery.￿
Somewhat surprisingly, the existing literature has no systematic analysis of these puzzling ob-
servations. This also turns out to be a big handicap for a policymaker interested in designing
politically sustainable reforms. In order to address the lacunae in the analytical literature address-
ing this issue, we propose a simple framework. We begin by observing that all reforms typically
have distributional consequences and result in ￿winners￿ and ￿losers￿. An important aspect of our
framework is that citizen-workers face individual speci￿c uncertainty as to whether they will be
￿winners￿ or ￿losers￿, as in Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Of course, governments have the abil-
ity to tax winners to compensate losers. We follow Jain and Mukand (2003) in endogenizing the
government￿s redistributive decision. We introduce two new elements in this framework. First, we
explicitly consider a dynamic reform process. Here both the implementation of the reform package,
as well as the revelation of winners and losers, takes place over time - as is almost always the case.
Second, we also recognize another feature that is common to most large scale reform packages,
namely, the aggregate uncertainty about the intertemporal distribution of winners and losers.3 In-
troduction of these elements generates a rich set of predictions about the evolution of public opinion
3Our ￿nding contrasts with Dewatripont and Roland (1995) who show that in the presence of aggregate uncertainty,
gradual reform is likely to be politically acceptable in a way that a one-shot implementation of the entire reform may
not be. Also see Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) on this.
3over the reform process. In this framework we show that even if governmental competence is not
an issue with the voting public, economic reforms may run into a political impasse.4
W es u g g e s tt h a tt h ek e ym a yl i ei nt h ee ﬀect that the reform process has on the balance of polit-
ical power. To see this, suppose that the gradual unfolding of the reform, reveals an unexpectedly
high number of winners in the initial stages of the reform. We identify two reasons why such an
outcome may turn some voters against further continuation of the reform. First, this surprisingly
high number of winners in the initial stages of the reform, may result in greater pessimism among
the remaining population, that they will eventually turn out to be winners. If so they will vote
against continuation and completion of the reform sequence. The second reason as to why a ma-
jority of public opinion may turn against continuation of the reforms is more striking: the political
feasibility of implementing redistributory compensation after the entire reform package has been
completed. If completion of the reform shifts the political balance of power towards the winners,
then voters are less likely to vote for the continuation if the redistributive compensation at stake
is large - which is more likely if there is more to redistribute, i.e. if the initial phase of the reform
￿went well￿. A complementary implication is that an initial worsening of economic conditions may
increase rather than decrease political support for the economic reform.
It is important to note that in our framework, partial economic reform arises in equilibrium when
the economy runs into a political impasse.5 Our framework also suggests a natural explanation for
the frequently observed phenomenon that a majority prefers to retain (and not reverse) partial
reforms, even though only a minority bene￿ts directly. The available evidence suggests that this
is in fact the more empirically relevant case (Rodrik (1996), Werner (1999)) - i.e., reforms tend to
run aground, rather than being reversed, as in the Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)m o d e l .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1 we provide an example, which
illustrates the mechanics of the model in a simple way. The basic framework is presented in
sections 2.2-2.3, and analyzed in section 2.4. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix and conclude
with a discussion in section 3.
4Acemoglu and Robinson(2001, 2002) develop a framework that emphasizes how technological and institutional
change may be blocked by elites, due to the adverse political eﬀects of such a change.
5Dewatripont and Roland (1992) show how partial reform may result in higher social welfare, when compensatory
transfers are taken into account.
42 A Model of Economic Policy Reform
The model is a somewhat simpli￿ed and expanded version of the model laid out in more detail
in Jain and Mukand (2003). We simplify the political structure by having voters vote directly on
reform, and on redistribution, whereas earlier we had formally modeled the electoral process in
terms of the representative democracy framework of Besley and Coate (1997, 1998) and Osborne
and Slivinski (1996). We extend our earlier model by considering reforms that take place in two
stages, so as to examine the dynamics of public support over the process of the reform.
T h ee s s e n c eo fo u rm o d e lc a np e r h a p sb e s tb ec o n v e y e db ym e a n so fas i m p l ee x a m p l e ,w h i c h
may also help to ￿x ideas.
2.1 An Example
Consider an economy consisting of 100 citizen workers. A two stage reform is being contemplated in
which, in each of the two stages, the winners would each gain $100, while the rest of the population
w o u l de a c hl o s e$ 2 0 . I nt h e￿rst stage of the reform, the number of workers that will emerge as
winners is uncertain. This number can be either 36 (in the ￿High￿ outcome) or 100/3 (in the ￿Low￿
outcome).6 Thus, if the High outcome is realized, then the rise in national income, or the amount
available for redistribution, is $23.20 per head, calculated as the average gain of all 100 workers,
among whom 36 workers gain $100, and 64 lose $20, each. Similarly, if the ￿rst period outcome
is Low, then the amount available for redistribution is $20 per head, calculated by noting that a
t h i r do fa l lw o r k e r sg a i n$ 100 each, while two-thirds lose $20 each. Regardless of the ￿rst period
outcome, the losers retain a majority, so there is complete redistribution at the end of the ￿rst
period. Obviously, there is more available for redistribution after a High ￿rst period outcome than
after a Low one.
In the second stage, there is no aggregate uncertainty - it is common knowledge that a quarter
of the losing population in the ￿rst period will emerge as winners in the second stage. Thus, if
both stages of the reform are enacted, then the total proportion of the population that emerges as
winners at the end of two periods is 1
2 if the ￿rst period outcome is Low, while it is slightly higher,
6The probabilities associated with these outcomes do not matter, but one can assume that each ￿rst stage outcome
is equally likely.
55 2p e r c e n t ,i nt h ec a s et h a tt h e￿rst period outcome is High. To keep the example simple, we make
the tie-breaking assumption that if half the population emerge as winners, then their views will
prevail with regard to redistribution. Hence, if both stages of the reform are enacted, then there
will be no redistribution after the second stage. By contrast, if the status quo is maintained, and
the second stage reform is not enacted, then the ￿rst period losers retain the power to redistribute.
It is easy to check that, for the ￿rst period losers (who are the pivotal decision makers at the
beginning of the second period), the expected gain from continuing with the second stage reform is
$20.7 As established above, the expected payoﬀ from maintaining the status quo after a Low ￿rst
stage is $20, hence, after a Low ￿rst period outcome, the second stage reform continues.8
What if the ￿rst period reform outcome had been high? In that case, as shown above, the
amount available for redistribution is $23.20 per head, if the status quo is maintained. And as we
have also seen, the expected payoﬀ to the pivotal voters, from a continuation of the reform, is $20.
Thus, the intuition is clear: a High ￿rst period means that there are more gains to be consolidated,
i.e., more is being risked if reforms continue, than if the ￿rst period outcome were Low.9
T h ek e yp o i n th e r ei st h a t ,a tt h ee n do ft h e￿rst stage, the losers retain their majority, regardless
of whether the ￿rst stage outcome was High or Low. Hence there will be complete redistribution at
the end of the ￿rst stage. If the ￿rst stage losers choose to continue with the second stage reform,
then again, regardless of the ￿rst period outcome, the majority at the end of the second period will
rest with the winners, and there will be no redistribution at the end of the second period. Hence,
in choosing whether to continue with the second stage reform, the ￿rst period losers face a choice.
They can either continue with the reform, and gamble on being winners the second time around,
while running the risk of losing the power to redistribute. Or, they can choose to maintain the
status quo, and consolidate their ￿rst period gains by retaining the power to redistribute. They
7The probability of being a winner is
1




8Again, for simplicity, we make the tie-breaking assumption that, if the payoﬀs from continuation of reform and
from stopping the reform are equal, then reform continues.
9It is also straightforward to demonstrate that our example is not an artifact of our assumption that the proportion
of winners in the second period is the same regardless of the ￿rst stage outcome. Our example would also go through
i f ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,w ek e p tt h enumber of winners in the second period constant, say at 16.66, the number of second
period winners realized after a Low ￿rst period outcome.
6are more likely to choose to consolidate their ￿rst period gains, by halting the second stage reform,
when those gains from the ￿rst period reform are relatively large. Hence, reform runs aground after
aH i g h￿rst stage, whereas it would continue after a Low ￿rst stage.We turn next to developing
this insight in a more formal model.
2.2 The Economic Structure
We consider an economy with two sectors, denoted by M and X, whose productivity and wages
depend on the amount of government expenditure (for example, on infrastructure) on each sector.
Suppose that, for an equal level of government expenditure, productivity in the X sector is always
higher than that in the M sector.10 However, as a consequence of a pre-existing distortion in the
pattern of government expenditure, wages across the two sectors are equal, pre-reform. We model
the reform as comprising a reallocation of government expenditure away from the less productive
M sector and toward the more productive X s e c t o r .T h i sr e a l l o c a t i o nt a k e st w op e r i o d st or e a l i z e .
At each stage, the reform will also change the returns to labor in the two sectors. Wages in the
X sector rise, and those in the M sector fall, and there is some intersectoral labor reallocation,
with workers who end up in the X sector gaining from the reform, and those who remain in the M
sector losing, due to the fall in their wages. Speci￿cally, using θ to denote the impact of the reform,
(which may be a stochastic function of the extent to which government expenditure is reallocated),
winners in the ￿rst stage (i.e., workers in the X sector) see their wages rise to w+θw, while losers
get w − δθw,w h e r ew is the pre-reform wage in both sectors, and δ,θ ∈ (0,1), which ensures that
even the losing sector￿s wage is always non-negative.11 The proportion of M sector workers who
gain from the ￿rst stage (respectively, second stage) reform is a function of θ1 (respectively, θ2)
and is denoted by α(θ1) (respectively, α(θ2)). We assume that all workers in the M sector face
individual-speci￿c uncertainty, i.e., that while all M sector workers know that a proportion α(θt)
of them will move sectors as a consequence of a state t reform, each individual worker is uncertain
10For simplicity, assume that quantities and prices are normalized in such a way that ￿productivity￿ can simply be
interpreted as the value of output created by a unit of labor in the respective sectors.
11Below, we also impose an eﬃciency condition to ensure that all reforms under consideration are eﬃcient, i.e., the
national output expands, and that a higher value of θ implies a bigger increase in national output, so that we can
refer to θ as the ￿size￿ of the reform, synonymous with greater eﬃciency gains.
7about whether that proportion includes him speci￿cally. (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991;J a i na n d
Mukand, 2003). Hence, α(θt) can also be interpreted as the probability that a given M sector
worker will emerge as a winner from the reform at stage t = 1,2.
2.3 The Political Structure
We next describe the political structure of the model. As described earlier, the reform takes place
over two periods. At the start of stage 1, workers vote on whether to launch the reform. If
they vote not to launch the reform, and maintain the status quo, then all workers continue to
earn their status quo wage w. However, in voting on whether to launch the reform, workers face
some uncertainty about the outcome of the ￿rst stage reform. If they vote to launch the stage 1
reform, two outcomes are possible in the ￿rst period - a successful, or ￿High￿, outcome, versus a
less successful ￿Low￿ outcome, respectively, θH
1 and θL
1 where obviously, θH
1 > θL
1 .A t t h e e n d o f
each stage, voters can choose a tax-transfer scheme to tax or compensate a worker i with wages wit
with a tax of τit in period t ( an e g a t i v ev a l u ed e n o t e sat r a n s f e r ) .W ei m p o s es o m er e s t r i c t i o n so n
this vector: workers with identical wages cannot be taxed at diﬀerent rates and a regressive tax on
wages is ruled out. At the start of stage 2, voters choose whether to continue with the reform, i.e.,
implement the second stage, or not. However, for simplicity, there is no uncertainty about the size
of the reform at this stage. If the second stage reform is implemented, then a proportion α(θ2)o f
the workers in the M sector at the beginning of the second stage are revealed to be winners, and
see their wages rise to w +( θ1 + θ2)w (along with those workers who had moved to the X sector
in the ￿rst stage), while those who remain in the M sector will see their wages drop (further) to
w−δ(θ1 +θ2)w. Each worker makes his voting decisions at each stage to maximize his net income
wit − τit, over the two periods. There is no discounting.
For simplicity, suppose that initially, all workers are in the M sector at the start of stage 1.
Consider now a sequence of reforms that has the following properties. The ￿rst stage reform,
irrespective of whether it achieves a ￿High￿ or ￿Low￿ outcome, results in the M sector retaining its
majority at the end of stage 1,i . e . ,
α(θL
1 ) < α(θH
1 ) < 1
2
8Further, suppose that if the total reform (over both periods) is implemented, then it is large
enough that, regardless of whether the ￿rst stage reform has a ￿High￿ or ￿Low￿ outcome, the M
sector becomes a minority after the ￿grand￿ reform. In other words, if both stages of the reform are
implemented, then
α(θL
1 )+α(θ2).(1 − α(θL
1 )) > 1
2
α(θH
1 )+α(θ2).(1 − α(θH
1 )) > 1
2
It is easy to check that more winners are realized after two stages if the ￿rst stage has a high
outcome, than if it has a low outcome, i.e, α(θH
1 )+α(θ2).(1−α(θH
1 )) > α(θL
1 )+α(θ2).(1−α(θL
1 )).
These conditions make the political structure of this model very straightforward. At the end of
the ￿rst stage, since the M sector retains its majority, there will always be full redistribution, i.e.,
each worker￿s post-tax wage will be the average wage for the society. (See, for example, Dixit and
Londregan (1995)). Hence, looking ahead, in considering whether to continue with the reform or
not, we need only consider the expected payoﬀs to those workers who are still in the M sector at
the beginning of stage 2. At the end of the second stage, however, the balance of political power
swings toward the X sector workers, so that at the end of the second stage there is no redistribution.
Hence, at the beginning of stage 2, the continuation of reforms hinges on whether the M sector
workers (who are still in the majority) think that the expected gain from continuation justi￿es the
risk associated with the loss of the power to redistribute at the end of the second stage.
2.4 Solving the Model
We need to show that there exist parameters such that (1) the stage 2 reform will be launched (will
not be launched) if the ￿rst stage outcome is ￿Low￿ (￿High￿) - i.e., that a more successful reform
may run aground, where a less successful one would win continued passage; and (2) although voters
anticipate this, they still choose to launch the ￿rst stage of the reforms. Further, these parameters
should also satisfy the eﬃciency condition, which ensures that all reforms under consideration
increase the national ￿pie￿ and a larger value of θ is synonymous with a larger increase in output.
In Appendix A.1, we show that a condition that ensures this is that
α(θ)
1−α(θ) ≥ δ. For simplicity, we




1 to denote the average societal income after a ￿High￿ and ￿Low￿ ￿rst
stage outcome respectively, the two sets of conditions needed are:
(1) Stage 2 reform: we need to show that
(i) Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) ≤ wH
1
(ii) Eu(θ2 | θL
1 ) ≥ wL
1
(2) Stage 1 reform: we need to show that
Eu1(θ1 > 0) ≥ 2.w
In other words, the expected two-period payoﬀ from launching reforms (the subscripted 1 is to
remind ourselves that the expectation is being considered at the start of stage 1)m u s tb eg r e a t e r
than the status quo payoﬀ,w h i c hi st h ea v e r a g ew a g ei ne a c ho ft h et w op e r i o d s . S i n c ew eh a v e
assumed that all workers are M sector workers at the start of stage 1, the average wage is trivially
w,t h eMs e c t o rw a g e .
The paradox that successful reforms run aground where less successful ones win continued pas-
sage is sharpened by the observation that, in our model, there is a positive correlation between the
eﬃciency bene￿ts from the ￿rst period reform and those from the second period reform. Formally,
relegating the proof to Appendix A.2, note that Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) >E u (θ2 | θL
1 )f o ra l le ﬃcient reforms,
i.e., the expected bene￿t (to the workers still in the M sector at the start of stage 2) of continuing
the reform are greater after a High stage 1 reform, than after a Low stage 1 reform. Further, this
is true for society as a whole too. Hence, there is a positive correlation between the bene￿ts of the
two reforms - i.e., if the ￿rst stage is High, then the bene￿ts of continuation are higher than if the
￿rst stage is Low, both for those left behind in the M sector at the end of the ￿rst stage, and for
society as a whole.
We turn next to analyzing the conditions for each of the stages set out above.
(1) Conditions for stage 2 reform:
(i) Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) ≤ wH
1
(ii) Eu(θ2 | θL
1 ) ≥ wL
1
10In Appendix A.3, we show that there exist parameters for which conditions (i) and (ii) both
hold. Here, we just provide an intuitive outline of the steps required to show that. Conditions (i)
and (ii) boil down to a requirement that:
{α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θH
1 w ≥ [α(θ2) − (1 − α(θ2)).δ]θ2w ≥ {α(θL
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θL
1 w
Now, note that the expression in the middle is positive, by the eﬃciency condition. The
expression on the right can be made as small as needed, and even negative, by assuming that
α(θL
1 ) ≤ α(θ2). And the expression on the left can be made as large as necessary by making α(θH
1 )
much larger than α(θ2) (subject, of course, to α(θH
1 ) < 1/2).
(2) Condition for stage 1 reform:
Eu1(θ1 > 0) ≥ 2.w
Intuitively, this condition must be true - each worker (and at the start of period 1,t h e ya r e
all in the M sector) is faced with a reform that could result in the national pie expanding once,
or possibly twice. Since they are risk-neutral, the eﬃciency condition alone should be suﬃcient
to guarantee that they vote for the reform to go forward, knowing that it can always be stopped




1 ,0), and (θL
1 ,0), corresponding to whether the ￿rst stage outcome is
High/Low, and whether reform is implemented or not in the second stage. As we have described
above, intuitively, there are only two possible political equilibria. In one, the ￿rst stage outcome is
￿High￿ and the reform is halted after the ￿rst stage, but the (larger) national income is redistributed
evenly. In the other,.the ￿rst stage outcome is ￿Low￿ and the second stage reform is implemented,
but that only happens if the ￿rst period losers expect to gain from the second stage. In either case,
in expected terms, the worker is better oﬀ than with the status quo, hence he will vote to launch
the ￿rst stage reform.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that, in some sense, the initial success of a reform might sow the
s e e d so fi t so w nd e s t r u c t i o n :t h es u c c e s so fr e f o r mi nt h e￿rst period (in terms of changing wages
11and reallocating workers) ensures that the reform process runs into a political impasse and remains
incomplete. So we might have a situation where a majority would support the reform sequence if
it could feasibly be implemented in one shot, but it may not be implemented sequentially. Observe
that the dynamics of public opinion in our example mirror many of the experiences with reform in
Latin America, and at least for a while, that of the Polish case - support for continuation of the
reform collapses after the completion of the initial phase of reforms, even though that phase of the
reforms has been successful.12
The essential contribution of this research is two-fold. First, it shows that, pace Przeworski
(1993), the often-puzzling dynamics of public opinion over the course of large-scale economic reform
is not due to some kind of myopia or irrationality on the part of voters, but rather a result of a
very rational calculus. Nor, pace Stokes (1996), can these puzzling dynamics be attributed to a
belief among voters that there is a negative correlation in the performance of the two stages of the
reform. On the contrary, one would expect a successful initial reform to cause voters to favorably
update their beliefs about both the reform itself, and about the government implementing the
reform.Thus, forward-looking voters should expect, if anything, a positive correlation in the stages
of the reform, as is implicit in our model. Even then, as this paper shows, rational forward-looking
voters might turn against reforms that are proceeding successfully. Second, equally importantly,
this research emphasizes the importance of reform design in ensuring the political sustainability of
the reform. In particular, we argue that it may not be enough to look at the overall proportions
of winners and losers to make an assessment of likely political constraints that may be faced by
policymakers. Rather, the intertemporal order of revelation of winners and losers creates political
constituencies, sometimes in unexpected ways.13 There is no particular reason to believe that
winners and losers are revealed in identical proportions in each period, and as Blanchard (1997)
12It should be pointed out that there is no unanimity among observers on whether, and to what extent, the ￿rst
phase of Polish reform was successful. More generally, several recent papers have argued that the success or failure
of reforms in Eastern Europe has the ￿expected￿ eﬀect on public opinion - e.g., greater support for reforms that are
proceeding successfully (see, for example, Fidrmuc (2000a, 2000b), Hayo (2001, 2003) and Kim and Pirttila (2003)).
Our use of this case study is intended only as an example to illustrate our point that perfectly rational voters may
block continuation of apparently successful reforms.
13For another example, see Wei (1997).
12documents for Eastern Europe, reform entailed substantial sectoral reallocation, whose impact over
time was far from uniform. In these circumstances, as a number of recent papers have argued,
public opinion matters a great deal (see, for example, the references in Roland (2000), and Hayo
(2003)).
More generally, we believe that a political economy approach to policy questions surrounding
economic reform appears to be a rich area for future research, both in terms of providing explana-
tions for what appears to be irrational or myopic behavior by economic agents, but also in narrowing
the interdisciplinary gap between the economics and the politics of policy reform.
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16Appendix
Eﬃciency condition
This condition requires that
α(θ)
1−α(θ) ≥ δ, or equivalently, that α(θ) ≥ δ
1−δ.
Derivation: Eﬃciency requires that:
α(θ).(w + θw)+( 1 − α(θ)).(w − δθw) ≥ w (E.1)
⇐⇒ α(θ).θw − (1 − α(θ)).δθw ≥ 0
⇐⇒ α(θ) ≥ (1 − α(θ)).δ
⇐⇒
α(θ)
1−α(θ) ≥ δ ⇐⇒ α(θ) ≥ δ
1−δ
When we assume that α(θ)=θ, then this condition becomes:
θ
1−θ ≥ δ, i.e., that θ ≥ δ
1−δ
It is also easy to check that the left-hand side expression in (E.1) above is increasing in θ.I n
other words, the eﬃciency bene￿ts of a reform are increasing in θ.
Second stage bene￿ts are larger after a High ￿rst stage
Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) >E u (θ2 | θL
1 )f o ra l le ﬃcient reforms, i.e., the expected bene￿t (to the workers
still in the M sector at the start of stage 2) is higher after a ￿successful￿ ￿rst stage.
Proof:
Eu(θ2 | θH
1 )=α(θ2).[w +( θH
1 + θ2)w]+( 1 − α(θ2)).[w − δ(θH
1 + θ2)w]
and similarly for Eu(θ2 | θL
1 ). Intuitively, this must be true: essentially, we are comparing
the bene￿ts of a reform of size θH
1 + θ2 with a reform of size θL
1 + θ2,s os i m p l ee ﬃciency should
guarantee that the High reform has a higher overall payoﬀ than the Low one. Check:
Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) >E u (θ2 | θL
1 )
⇔ α(θ2).[w +( θH
1 + θ2)w]+( 1 − α(θ2)).[w − δ(θH
1 + θ2)w] > α(θ2).[w +( θL





1 )w] > (1 − α(θ2)).[δ(θH




1 )w] > (1 − α(θ2)).[δ(θH
1 − θL
1 )w]




which is just the eﬃciency condition. Intuitively, this can also be seen as follows: For the
workers who emerge as winners in stage 2, the wage gain is much larger after a stage 1 of θH
1 than
after θL
1 (their wage jumps from w − δθH
1 w to w +( θH




This claim - that second stage bene￿ts are larger after a High ￿rst stage than after a Low ￿rst
stage - is true for society as a whole too. For society as a whole, the proof is a little more complicated






1 )[θ2w]+( 1 − α(θL
1 )).[α(θ2).{(θL
1 + θ2)w + δθL
1 w} +( 1 − α(θ2)).{−δθ2w}]
Note that the term in the second square bracket is greater on the LHS than on the RHS. Use
A to denote it, assuming that it￿s equal on both sides.
⇔ (α(θH
1 ) − α(θL
1 ))[θ2w] > (1 − α(θL
1 )).[A] − (1 − α(θH
1 )).[A]
⇔ (α(θH
1 ) − α(θL
1 ))[θ2w] > (α(θH
1 ) − α(θL
1 ))[A]
Hence, if we can show that θ2w>A , then that is suﬃcient.
θ2w>A
⇔ θ2w>α(θ2).{(θH
1 + θ2)w + δθH
1 w} +( 1 − α(θ2)).{−δθ2w}
⇔ θ2w − α(θ2).θ2w>α(θ2).{θH
1 w + δθH
1 w} +( 1 − α(θ2)).{−δθ2w}
⇔ (1 − α(θ2)).θ2w +( 1 − α(θ2)).{δθ2w} > α(θ2).{θH
1 w + δθH
1 w}
⇔ (1 − α(θ2)).[θ2w + δθ2w] > α(θ2).θH
1 w[1 + δ]
⇔ (1 − α(θ2)).θ2w[1 + δ] > α(θ2).θH
1 w[1 + δ]















⇔ (1 − α(θ2)) > α(θH
1 )
18N o w ,s i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a ta l lr e f o r m sθ are such that α(θ) < 1/2, therefore the LHS
must be greater than RHS. Thus, we have proved that there is a positive correlation between the
bene￿ts of the two reforms - i.e., if the ￿rst stage is High, then the bene￿ts of continuation are
higher than if the ￿rst stage is Low, both for those left behind in the M sector at the end of the
￿rst stage, and for society as a whole.
Conditions for stage 2 reform
(i) Eu(θ2 | θH
1 ) ≤ wH
1
(ii) Eu(θ2 | θL




1 ).[w + θH
1 w]+( 1 − α(θH
1 )).[w − δθH
1 w]
So condition (i) requires that:
α(θ2).[w+(θH
1 +θ2)w]+(1−α(θ2)).[w−δ(θH











1 )).[w − δθH
1 w]






⇔ α(θ2).θ2w − (1 − α(θ2)).δθ2w ≤ {α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.[w + θH
1 w] − {α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.[w − δθH
1 w]
⇔ α(θ2).θ2w − (1 − α(θ2)).δθ2w ≤ {α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.[θH
1 w + δθH
1 w]
⇔ [α(θ2) − (1 − α(θ2)).δ]θ2w ≤ {α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θH
1 w
Similarly, condition (ii) requires that:
[α(θ2) − (1 − α(θ2)).δ]θ2w ≥ {α(θL
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θL
1 w
In both the inequalities above, the LHS can be interpreted as the expected in increase in per
capita income due to the second stage reform alone. Note that it is the same expression in both
19conditions, since it is independent of the ￿rst stage outcome. In other words, combining both
conditions, we need parameters such that:
{α(θH
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θH
1 w ≥ [α(θ2) − (1 − α(θ2)).δ]θ2w ≥ {α(θL
1 ) − α(θ2)}.(1 + δ)θL
1 w
Now, note that the expression in the middle is positive, by the eﬃciency condition. The
expression on the right can be made as small as needed, and even negative, by assuming that
α(θL
1 ) ≤ α(θ2). And the expression on the left can be made as large as necessary by making α(θH
1 )
much larger than α(θ2) (subject, of course, to α(θH
1 ) < 1/2).
For example, set α(θ)=θ.S e t α(θL
1 )=α(θ2)=1/3. Then the expression on the right is
0. The eﬃciency condition required to ensure that the expression in the middle is positive is:
δ ≤
α(θ2)
1−α(θ2) ⇔ δ ≤
1/3
2/3 ⇔ δ ≤ 1


















For this to be greater than the expression in the middle, (and keeping in mind that θL
1 < θH
1 < 1/2,
i.e., 1/3 < θH




































6–.2687. One root is negative, and the other one is about .43. This is an upward opening parabola,
so values between the two roots are below the x-axis. So check with an example: set θH
1 >. 43.
Speci￿cally, let θH












320w,w h i c h
is slightly over 1
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